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Although the Court did not adopt a standard of strict scrutiny for
forced administration of drugs, the state's burden to provide procedural
protections to the defendant remains high. In cases where competency
is a central issue, defense counsel should pursue all possible procedural
avenues. One of the most important of these tools for defense counsel is
requesting appointment of a mental health expert for indigent defendants
through Ake v. Oklahoma,15 and Virginia's mitigation expert statute.
16
Such an expert may be crucial in litigating whether there is a need for
forced medication to achieve competency and in establishing the drug's
potential adverse effects at trial, especially on the defendant's demeanor
and thought process.
17
An expert also may be particularly helpful inestablishing apotential
Eighth Amendment violation as a result of forced medication. Because
of procedural default, the Court did not address Riggins' Eighth Amend-
ment argument that administration of the drugs had affected his de-
meanor at trial and impaired his penalty phase defense. The argument,
however, may have a great deal of merit. In Justice Kennedy's concur-
ring opinion, he noted the great weight which a showing of remorse may
carry with a jury at the sentencing phase of a capital case.18 Clearly, the
forced administration of anti-psychotic drugs may interfere with the
defendant's ability to show remorse, an important mitigating factor. The
Court implied that the Eighth Amendment issue in this context is an open
15 470 U.S. 68 (1985). To obtain a state appointed expert underAke,
defense counsel must show that insanity will be a major factor in the
defense, that an expert is truly necessary, and that refusing to appoint an
expert will deny defendant a fair trial.
16 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.3:1(A) (1990). Under Virginia's
mental mitigation expert statute, an indigent capital defendant is auto-
matically provided with a mental health expert if he is charged with or
convicted of capital murder. The statute requires all state appointed
mental health experts to submit a detailed written report to defense
counsel on possible mitigating factors in the defendant's case. Va. Code
Ann. §19.2-264.3:1(C) (1990). More generally, defense experts act as
question, and therefore it is an argument defense counsel should pursue.
As with all federal constitutional arguments, defense counsel must be
sure to continuously raise the objection to preserve this issue for appeal.
Defense attorneys in Virginia may find the decision in Riggins
helpful in several respects. First of all, the Court confirms that a pretrial
detainee generally retains a liberty interest to avoid the forced adminis-
tration of drugs. Although the Court did not adopt a standard of strict
scrutiny, the state still must make a substantial showing that invasion of
the defendant's liberty interest is justified. Second, the opinion under-
scores the importance of skillful use of experts and investigators, who
may aid in rebutting the state's claim that it has met the Harper
prerequisites. Finally, nothing in the language of the opinion detracts
from the potentially potent due process and Eighth Amendment argu-
ments that forced administration of drugs impermissibly interferes with
a defendant's rights to a fair trial and a fair capital penalty hearing.
Although Riggins does not break new ground in the area of competency
law or substantive due process, it does reaffirm that pretrial detainees and
inmates retain a liberty interest, and leaves the door open for an extension
of those rights.
Summary and Analysis by:
Paul M. O'Grady
consultants for the defense and can aid greatly in building a theory of
mitigation.
17 See generally Konrad, Getting the Most and Giving the Least
fi'om Virginia's "Mental Health Mitigation" Statute, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 2 2 (1991); and Murtaugh, Mitigation: The Use
ofa Mental Health Expert in Capital Trials, Capital Defense Digest, Vol.
1, No. 2, p. 16 (1989).
18 Riggins, 112 S.Ct. at 1819-1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citing Geimer& Amsterdam, Why Jurors VoteLife orDeath: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am.J.Crim.L 1, 51-53
(1987-1988)).
MEDINA v. CALIFORNIA
112 S.Ct. 2572 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1984 Teofila Medina, Jr. stole a gun from a Santa Ana pawn shop
and in the following weeks held up two gas stations, a drive-in dairy, and
a market. He killed three employees of these businesses, attempted to rob
a fourth employee, and shot at two passersby who attempted to follow
him. Medina was arrested a few weeks after he stole the gun and was
charged with a number of offenses, including three counts of first degree
murder.
Before his trial, Medina's counsel moved for a hearing to determine
if Medina was competent to stand trial.t Under California state law, "[a]
person cannot be tried or adjudged to punishment while such person is
mentally incompetent. ' 2 A defendant is mentally incompetent "if, as a
result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is
unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist
counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner."3 Under the
1 Medina's hearing was conducted pursuant to Cal. Penal Code
Ann. § 1368 (West 1982).
2 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1367 (West 1982).
3 Id.
California statute, there is a presumption that the defendant is competent,
and the burden of proving that the defendant is incompetent by a
preponderance of the evidence falls to the party claiming incompetence.
4
The court granted Medina's motion, and the competency issue was
tried before a jury. The hearing lasted six days and included conflicting
testimony from a number of experts.5 One psychiatrist, who had known
Medina while he was a prisoner in Arizona, testified that the defendant
was a paranoid schizophrenic and was incompetent to assist his counsel
at trial. A clinical psychologist doubted the diagnosis of schizophrenia
but expressed no opinion on competency. A different psychiatrist also
doubted the schizophrenia diagnosis but leaned toward competency.
Another psychologist found Medina schizophrenic but competent. Ajail
psychiatrist found that Medina suffered from depression, but that he was
competent and may have been malingering. A physician who treated
Medina could give no opinion as to competence. On a number of
occasions during the hearing, Medina made both verbal and physical
4 Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 1369 (West 1982). 4!
5 The opinion does not reveal whether the experts testified on
behalf of the defendant or the State.
Page 10 - Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1
outbursts, including overturning the counsel table.
In accordance with California law, the jury was instructed that "the
defendant is presumed to be mentally competent and he has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally
incompetent as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability."
The jury found Medina competent to stand trial. At the guilt phase of
his trial, a new jury was impanelled and Medina pled not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity. Thejury found Medina guilty of three counts
of first degree murder and a number of lesser offenses. During the
penalty phase of trial, the jury returned a verdict of death and the trial
court imposed the death sentence.
On state appeal, Medina argued that Section 1369 of the California
Penal Code violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process in
two ways: (1) by placing the burden of proof on a defendant to establish
that he was incompetent to stand trial; and (2) by establishing a presump-
tion that a defendant is competent to stand trial unless proven otherwise
by a preponderance of the evidence. The California Supreme Court
denied Medina's appeal, 6 relying chiefly on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Leland v. Oregon.7 The Leland decision affirmed a
state statute requiring a defendant to prove the defense of insanity beyond
a reasonable doubt.8
HOLDING
The United State Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme
Court's judgment, holding that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit
a state from requiring a defendant who claims incompetence to bear the
burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evidence.9 In addition,
the Court held that a statutory presumption of competency does not
violate a defendant's procedural due process rights.10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Court rejected Medina's argument that the Mathews v.
EldridgeI1 balancing test for procedural due process claims was
proper in this case. 12 Noting that the Mathews test was developed to
address challenged administrative procedures, the Court distinguished
a state's procedural rules that are part of the criminal process from
procedures arising in the context of administrative or civil law. Pointing
6 People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282 (Cal. 1990).
7 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
8 Id.
9 Medina v. California, 112 S.Ct. 2572,2579 (1992).
10 Id. at 2581.
11 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Mathews test requires a court to
consider three factors in evaluating procedural due process: (1) the
interest affected; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest
through the existing procedure, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or different procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's
interest, including the function involved and the additional costs and/or
administrative burdens imposed by additional or different procedures.
12 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
balancing test of Mathews was appropriate in the criminal context. After
applying the balancing test, however, Justice O'Connor found that the
California statute still satisfied due process. Medina, 112 S.Ct. at 2582
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980) (rejecting a
due process challenge to the authority of federal magistrates to act in
suppression hearings); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding
that due process requires that an indigent capital defendant be provided
with access to psychiatric assistance).
14 Medina, 112 S.Ct. at 2577.
out that it had applied the Mathews test in a criminal context only twice,
13
the Court stated that it was "not at all clear" that the test was essential to
the outcome of those cases.
14
The Court adopted as the correct approach the test applied in
Patterson v. New York, 15 which was decided after Mathews.16 The
Patterson test gives deference to state legislatures in matters of criminal
procedure. Unless the procedure "offends some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental," '17 it will be upheld. According to the Court, placing the
burden of proving incompetency upon a defendant does not offend a
deeply rooted principle ofjustice. 18 The Court found no historical basis
for holding that due process is violated by this burden. 19 The Court also
found that the rule is not fundamentally unfair in its operation.20 Once
the state provides a defendant with procedures to evaluate competency,
due process is satisfied.
21
Medina also argued that placing the burden of proving incompe-
tency upon a defendant is inconsistent with Pate v. Robinson.22 Pate
held that "a defendant whose competence is in doubt cannot be deemed
to have waived his right to a competency hearing." 23 The Court
distinguished Pate as applying prior to a competency hearing, while the
rule of Medina applies during the hearing itself.24 During the hearing,
a defendant has the assistance of counsel in proving incompetency, and
expert testimony maybe offered. The Courtpointed out that a defendant's
inability to assist his counsel may, in itself, be used as probative evidence
of incompetence. 25 The Court also concluded that defense counsel may
very well have the "best-informed" view of defendant's ability to
participate in his defense.
26
As to the California statute's presumption that a defendant is
competent, the Court held that the presumption essentially restates the
burden of proof. Therefore, the statutory presumption of competency
does not violate due process. 27
Virginia Code Section 19.2-169.1 sets forth the statutory procedures
for determining competency to stand trial in Virginia. Once theCommon-
wealth or the defense raises the issue of competence, the court must order
a competency evaluation to be performed by at least one qualified mental
health expert. 28 The Commonwealth and defense are required to provide
any information relevant to the examination to the expert.29 Once the
examination is completed, the expert must submit a written report to the
court and the attorneys for the Commonwealth and defense. 30 After
15 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
16 Medina, 112 S.Ct. at 2577.
17 Id. (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202) (internal quotations
omitted).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 2577-2578.
20 Id. at 2578-2579.
21 Id. at 2579.
22 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
23 Medina, 112 S.Ct. at 2579 (citing Pate, 383 U.S. at 384).
24 Id. at 2580.
25 Id.
26 Id. The dissenting opinion questioned this conclusion by
pointing out that it is not likely that defense counsel will testify to these
points at a competency hearing and that defense counsel is actually
afforded little opportunity for contact with a client who is incarcerated
pending trial. Therefore, the dissent argued, the state is in a much better
position to observe the defendant and should consequently be required to
prove competency. Id. at 2587-2588 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
27 Id. at 2581.
28 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1A (1990).
29 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1C (1990).
30 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1D (1990).
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receiving this report, the court determines if the defendant is competent
to stand trial.3 1 A hearing on the issue is not required unless requested
by one of the parties.32 As with the California statute in Medina, at a
Virginia competency hearing, the party raising the issue of incompetency
must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence.33 As a practical
matter, in almost all cases this will be the defendant. Further, while there
is no statutory presumption of sanity under Section 19-2.169.1, Payne v.
Slayton34 and Graham v. Gathright35 established that a defendant is
presumed to be sane at trial.
Although the Virginia statute only requires that one expert be
ordered to evaluate the defendant's competency, there appears to be no
exclusion to a defendant being examined by an expert of his own choice.
If a hearing is held, the defendant has the right to introduce evidence and,
presumably, this evidence could include expert testimony of the
defendant's choice. The statute is silent, however, on what happens
31 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-169.1E (1990).
32 Id.
33 Id.
when an indigent defendant is unable to pay for expert assistance of his
or her choosing.
In Ake v. Oklahoma36, the United States Supreme Court held that
where a defendant's mental condition will be a significant factor at trial,
the state is required to provide an indigent defendant with psychiatric
assistance. Therefore, in a Virginia competency proceeding, if an
indigent defendant desires to be examined and assisted by a psychiatric
expert, defense counsel should argue that Ake requires the Common-
wealth to provide this assistance. Particularly in light of the Medina
decision, a compelling argument can be made that if a defendant must
bear the burden of proving incompetency, due process requires that the
means for bearing that burden must be made available.
Summary and analysis by:
Susan F. Henderson
34 329 F.Supp. 886 (W.D.Va. 1971).
35 345 F.Supp. 1148 (W.D.Va. 1972).
36 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
STRINGER v. BLACK
112 S.Ct. 1130 (1992)
SOCHOR v. FLORIDA
112 S.Ct. 2114 (1992)
ESPINOSA v. FLORIDA
112 S.Ct. 2926 (1992)
United States Supreme Court
During the 1992 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
three cases with potentially broad application to Virginia law, particu-
larly with respect to Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor.1 This
summary will first examine each case individually and then attempt to
draw some broader implications from the Court's rulings in all three
cases.
CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND:
THE SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT
When the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty
was not a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment's proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment, it placed a duty on states that allow capital
1 Virginia law permits imposition of the death penalty for capital
murder only where at least one of two statutory aggravating circum-
stances exists. The second such factor is that "the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." Va. Code Ann. §
19.2-264.4(C) (1990). See also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1990).
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J.,
punishment to establish a "meaningful method for differentiating be-
tween the few cases where [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."2 In Godfrey v. Georgia3 the Supreme Court
found that the application of the Georgia "vileness" factor failed to meet
the obligation enunciated in Furman because "nothing in [the factor's]
few words, standing alone, . . . implie[d] any inherent restraint on the
arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence." The statute in
Godfrey allowed imposition of the death penalty under the exact same
terms as the Virginia statute, where the offense was "outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity
of mind or aggravated battery to the victim." 4 The Court found this
language to be unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.
The Court revisited the issue in Maynard v. Cartwright.5 Okla-
concurring) (quoted in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
3 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by
Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
4 Ga. Code § 27-2534.1(b)(7) (1978).
5 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (requiring a narrowing construction of
Oklahoma "vileness" factor). See case summary of Maynard, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15 (1988).
